Gillmore Centre Symposium on Central Bank Digital Currencies

Friday 7 May 2021, 14:00 - 16:00 (BST, GMT+1)

Organized by the Gillmore Centre for Financial Technology with the Bank of England

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) are being developed and launched as digital forms of sovereign currencies worldwide. CBDCs have the potential to profoundly impact economies and reshape financial and payment systems globally. 

This online symposium explores the latest developments in CBDC from industry, policy, and academic research perspectives. 

Simon Collins, Mastercard: Ecosystem Orchestration & Implications for CBDC’s

  • Simon will discuss Mastercard’s learnings from managing the orchestration of multi-sided payment ecosystems and the principles that may be applied to developing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). His topics will include the importance of establishing sustainable Standards, creating structures to manage ecosystem participants effectively, driving improvement in the health and quality of the ecosystem, and placing the end-user experience and protections at the heart of any ecosystem design. These issues will be critical as CBDCs mature and provide an important area for further academic research.

Darrell Duffie, Stanford University: Perspectives on China's Digital Currency Electronic Payment System

  • This talk will overview some of the motives and implications of China's Digital Currency Electronic Payment System (DC/EP). What are the most likely motives for the introduction of DC/EP? To what extent might there be significant adoption of DC/EP technologies within offshore payment systems, use for cross-border payments, commercial advantages for China, or increased internationalization of the RMB? This talk will include an anonymous poll of participants' views on these and related issues.

Michael Kumhof, Bank of England: The Macroeconomics of Central Bank Issued Digital Currencies

  • We study the macroeconomic consequences of issuing central bank digital currency (CBDC) – a universally accessible and interest-bearing central bank liability that competes with bank deposits as a medium of exchange. In a DSGE model calibrated to match the pre-2008 US, we find that CBDC issuance of 30% of GDP, against government bonds, could permanently raise GDP by 3%, due to lower real interest rates, distortionary taxes, and monetary transaction costs. Countercyclical CBDC policy rules, as a second monetary policy tool, could substantially improve the central bank’s ability to stabilise the business cycle. Risks to banks can be minimized through appropriate issuance arrangements.